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ACCRETIVE CONSTRUCTIONISM AND ORALITY IN ISLAMIC LAW (continued)

 
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CONCLUSION

At the risk of sounding too simplistic, I could summarize the existing opinions on Islamic law as being either attributing it to God, or explaining it as a product of fabrication and manipulation of legal proofs.  There have been a number of studies that produced new theories that can be located between the abovementioned two positions.  This paper, which is a very brief summary of many years long study, brings into the forefront a couple of elements that are, in my opinion, very central and very fundamental to Islamic law and jurisprudence.  The conclusions could change the way we look at Islamic law not only from a legal studies perspective, but also from a history of religion point of view.

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The net result of this study only begins to answer some questions on the role of religious texts in guiding activities in the domain of law and jurisprudence.  Secondly, it also advances a modest theory on the existing discrepancies between legal rules and legal proofs.  In short, we are led to believe that Islamic law, throughout its formative period, can be best characterized as an accretive construction cemented by authorizing elocution that were inherited from privileged times and privileged individuals.

The evidence presented herein in support of the propositions is taken from four major sources and disciplines of law and religious dogma:  the Qur’án, the commentaries, the <adíth, and kalám.

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In the case of Islamic laws of inheritance, the majority of the legal rulings were pronounced, in an ascriptive constructional manner, during the lifetime of the Prophet and the era of al-Khiláfah al-Ráshidah.  The issuing of the legal judgments (a<kám) was in the form of oral edicts.  Firstly, as direct quotes from God,[89] and secondly as general or specific statements and practices by Muhammad.  The evidence that we have used in order to reach this particular conclusion is of two categories:  the Arabic Qur’ánic texts as preserved today, and the collection of exegetical and <adíthic materials that were recorded by Sunni and Shi`ite scholars in their authoritative books.[90] 

a)      Concerning the Qur’ánic texts, we have established that despite the claims that the Qur’án was recorded at a very early stage, such a written document could not have been used as the source of law by scholars during the formative period of law (past the time of Muhammad) since the earliest manuscripts that we have examined were simply illegible.[91]

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   And even if they were legible for some specialists, the undeveloped system of vocalization and diacritics of the texts that was used,[92] at least during the first three Islamic centuries, could not be conclusive in determining an exact reading of inheritance verses to the extent that it would lead to the fixing of the law the way it was fixed.  This particular historical evidence shows that the Qur’ánic statements could only have been articulated in a medium other than a written one—i.e. oral discourse that explicitly expressed the divine will.  Upon the examination of the current Qur’ánic texts, we have also discovered that the verbalization, the style, and the technique of the Qur’án are consistent with the characteristics of oral discourses and oral cultures.  The Qur’án in general, and the inheritance verses in particular, were phrased as direct speeches.  For instance, the opening of verses of inheritance states: yú#íkumu alláhu fí awládikum[93] The pronoun suffixes attached to the verb and noun of the sentence is that of the second person plural pronoun (you, masculine plural); hence it is a direct address to the believers, not a neutral or general statement.[94]  If we were to picture the context of this event, it would be reasonable to imagine Muhammad directly and orally addressing his followers and telling them of that which God is advising them in regards to their children.  He did not instruct them to read what God wants them to do; rather, he told them directly and orally of God’s instructions.  Similarly, the second important verse prescribing the laws of inheritance begins like so: yastaftúnaka quli alláhu yuftíkumu fil-kalálah[95] Again, this is not only a direct speech to the Prophet from God (they ask you), but it is also instructing him to say (qul in the imperative mood) to them what the ruling is.  The oral discourse of the Qur’án was not to be limited to the time of Muhammad; rather the practice of orally learning and transmitting the Qur’án was to continue beyond that time.  The Qur’án instructs Muhammad and the believers not to read (silent reading) the Qur’án, but to recite it (talá, or rattala).  In short, the laws that were based on the Qur’án were ultimately orally conceived and orally stated by virtue of the nature of the Qur’ánic discourse itself.

 
 

b)      The \adíth literature also, as the Arabic name indicates, is essentially oral speech.  Almost every tradition in all the books we have examined begins with <addathaní.  For example, in the Muwa>>a’, we read: <addathaní málik annahu balaghahu `an…,  wa <addathaní `an málik `an…, <addathaní ya<yá `an málik `an…, and wa <addathaní `an málik `an ya<yá[96] Similarly, in the Sunan and @a<í< works we find a variation of the same word “<addathaná” repeated three to four times before the equally important word “qála” which usually precede the actual tradition.  All collectors of the <adíth—including the Shi`ite compiler al-Kulayní—used the same formula wherein the word <addatha is used to enumerate the reporters of the tradition: <addathaná so-and-so <addathaná so-and-so <addathaná so-and-so `an so-and-so `an so-and-so `an so-and-so `an so-and-so qála…[97] The implication of this observation is to suggest that Islamic laws that were based on the <adíth were oral edicts that hardly relied on logical or philosophical reasoning.  Once it is verified (accepted) that the Prophet said something (or had done something) the ruling resulting from that <adíth becomes a binding legal proof.  In addition to the oral nature of \adíth, we have also determined that the Prophetic traditions by themselves did not, and could not, constitute the exclusive body of legal proofs that supported the laws of inheritance.  In fact, we have shown from the collection that the Prophetic <adíth is utterly inconclusive; hence, the role of Caliphal decrees in determining the law.[98]  The role of the Caliphs in the determination of the law of inheritance is underscored in a tradition in Muwa>>a’ Málik wherein it is stated that the determination of the share of the grandfather is the jurisdiction of the Caliph.[99]

c)      The attempt to systematize Islamic law and jurisprudence began as early as the first civil war and continued through the first half of the third Islamic century.  Throughout this time period as well, the primary mode of legal and theological arguments were exclusively oral as expressed in the discipline of kalám.  We have demonstrated that fiqh, u#úl al-fiqh, and other disciplines were initially part of the broader field known as kalám which literally means, “talking.”  Hence, even the earliest Islamic theoretical endeavor was firmly rooted in the oral discourse.  In other words, the slow conversion towards the adoption of writing did not take place until the post-kalám era that roughly occurred sometime after the defeat of the Mu`tazilite tendencies.

            Another major obstacle in determining the components of this construct is the identification of authority in the Islamic context.  Most scholars have tended to provide a historical descriptive analysis of religious authority, and little attention has been given to the formative period of these authorities.  It is a manageable task to provide a narrative detailing the rise of an influential scholar, but I propose that there is a substantial amount of information that can be learned from the experience of the individuals who failed to gain the status and recognition of legal and religious scholarship.  There is more to learn in failure than in success; since recognizing the elements that made one fail might identify with certainty what is not part of the making of an authority.  In other words, what made Abú Muslim a lesser authority on naskh? Or what made the Mu`tazilites fall from grace only to give rise to A<mad Ibn \anbal who took them on head-on?

            As I formulate answers to these questions, I am reminded of the moment when Ibn \anbal was reported to have said: 

I saw God in my dream and I asked him: “what is the best thing that a person ever does that brings him closer to You?” He said: “My Words O A<mad!”  I continued: “O Lord with proper understanding of Your Word or without?”  He said: “With and without understanding.”[100] 

That statement may seem as an incidental or a marginal thought without relevance or weight; but I would contend that it represents that component that the Mu`tazilites lacked: the oral mythical discourse.  Ibn \anbal might not have had the impressive intellectual genius that would have enabled him to present a flawless argument during debates, but he subscribed to the myth[101] that supported the numerous rituals.  Ibn \anbal was able to recite the myth over and over again, while the Mu`tazilites tried to explain the myth, hence collapsing this binary construct to an unsupportable credo.  To illustrate this point further, I would introduce the following tradition that explains the kind of justifications traditional Muslim authority relied on:

Muhammad Ibn Is<áq said: I saw the day of judgment occurring and I saw God—I heard His words and saw His light—Who asked me:  “What do you say about the Qur’án?” I said: “It is your word O Lord of the universe.”  He said: “Who told you that?”  I said:  “A<mad Ibn \anbal.”  He said:  “Thank God.”  Then He called upon A<mad and asked him:  “What do you say about the Qur’án?”  A<mad replied:  “Your Word, O Lord of the universe.”  God asked:  “And where did you learn that?”  A<mad then displayed a couple sheets of papers; one containing the statement of al-Mughírah as reported by Shu`bah, the other contained a statement of Ibn `Abbás as reported by `A>á’.  God called Shu`bah and asked him:  “What do you say about the Qur’án?”  He replied:  “It is your Word O Lord of the universe.”  He asked again: “Where did you learn that?”  Shu`bah answered: “From `A>á’ who learned it from Ibn `Abbás.” God did not call `A>á’ but called Ibn `Abbás and asked him: “What do you say about the Qur’án?”  He replied:  “It is your Word O Lord of the Universe.”  God asked:  “Where did you learn that?” He replied: “From Muhammad, the Messenger of God.”  The Messenger of God (peace and blessing be upon him) was called in and asked: “What do you say about the Qur’án?” He said:  “It is your Word O Lord of the universe.” God continued:  “Who told you that?” He said:  “Gabriel reported that You said so.   God then concluded saying: “You told the truth and so did they.”[102]

            Thus was the way authority was—and still is—established in orthodox Islam.  Just like any other religion, Islam depends on the myth component that would elevate the religious authority from the ordinary man into the desired medium that establishes the communion with God.  God is an extraordinary being who communicates to his subjects via extraordinary means.  In rejecting the myth and relying on rationale, one risks eliminating God all together.  I would argue that the success of the few schools of thought that depended on reason, owed that success to their ability to keep the myth as part of their discourse.  Religion depends on modes that can sustain logical scrutiny without forcing it to abandon its mythical component.  That could be done by relying on orality.  During the earliest stages, orality was manifested in the process of revelation that enables prophets to tell a story without being required to provide reasonable evidence.  After that, religious authority was maintained by recounting dreams and extraordinary visions that put them above and beyond scrutiny.  In mosques, just as is the case in churches and synagogues, we will find successful authorities and preachers, not readers, whether telling their personal dreams, or the dreams of others. 


 


[1] Amongst the influential authors who wrote on this topic, read: Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, ed. S. M. Stern (Albany: SUNY Press, 1967-1971); J. Schacht, The Origins Of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Norman Calder, Studies In Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990); G. H. A. Juynboll, Studies On The Origins And Uses of Islamic \adíth (Brookfield, Vt.: Variorum, 1996); Miklos Muranyi, `Abd Alláh b. Wahb (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1992); John E. Wansbrough, Quranic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); David S. Powers, Studies In Qur’án And \adíth (Berkeley: University of California Press, c1986).

[2] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999), 1.

[3] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999), 1.

[4] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999), 1.

[5] As summarized by Dutton, these problems were specifically in the area of texts and isnáds.  See Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999), 2.

[6] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999), 2.

[7] Emphasis mine; this word is crucial in understanding the scope of his theory as it will be demonstrated later.

[8] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999), 3.

[9] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999), 178-9.

[10] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999), 178.

[11] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999), 179.

[12] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999), 61-77.

[13] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999), 3.

[14] For instance, the principle of `awl is not necessarily based on the Qur’án.  In fact, Shi`ite scholarship rejects it all together because it conflicts the Qur’án.  We will discuss this case and similar ones in the chapters on tafsír and a<kám.

[15] Unless of course Dutton subscribes to the view that argues for an organic link that might take Islamic law past the Qur’ánic origins, a view that is not supported anywhere in his book.

[16] Dutton attempted to establish a link between the law and the primary sources by presenting cases that do have roots in the Qur’án and the earliest reported traditions of the Prophet (examples: case of ~ihár p. 65, children’s inheritance p. 72, debt p. 75, kalálah p. 106, qar’ p. 132, homicide p. 135, Ílá, p. 139, divorce p. 140, zakáh p. 146, `iddah, p. 151, qadhf p. 151 which happen to be explicitly mentioned in the Qur’án).  However, by all accounts, no Western scholar has claimed that the entire body of rulings is necessarily derived from sources outside those primary ones.  Citing cases that are rooted in the Qur’án then would not make dissenting scholars believe that other cases are based on it too.  We will present a number of cases that are clearly conflicting with Qur’ánic texts let alone being based on it, and to that, Dutton’s work provides no answers.

[17] Using the case of inheritance, we will show that there exist many rulings that can be supported neither on the basis of Qur’ánic injunctions, the exegetical traditions, nor from the body of <adíth literature.

[18] David Powers, Studies In Qur’án and \adíth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 142.

[19] John Wansbrough, Quranic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); G. H. A. Juynboll, Studies on the Origins and Uses of Islamic \adíth (Brookfield, Vt.: Variorum, 1996); G. H. A Juynboll, Muslim Tradition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983)

[20] In Fat< al-Bárí bishar< @a<í< al-Bukhárí, a tradition that appears in the collections of Abú Hurayrah and al-Tirmidhí as a report from the Prophet saying: “ta`allamú al-fará’i_ fa’innahá ni#f al-`ilm, wa annahu awwal má yunza`u min ummatí.”

[21] Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), Appendix B.

[22] Meaning its prescription in the Qur’ánic discourse.

[23] Meaning the codification of inheritance laws in the a<kám works.  It is my contention that a<kám is ultimately the final and posited understanding of Islamic law as opposed to the cursory primal expression of Qur’ánic dictates.

[24] Islamic law here must be understood as a process; hence, the organic connection is limited to theory not necessarily to the substance.

[25] By arguing for the organic continuity of Islamic law, one should not conclude that Islamic law necessarily reflects the intent and the letter of the Qur’ánic sanctions.  In fact we will present a number of cases to the contrary.  It is better to think of posited Islamic law as the persistence of primitive understanding that may or may not mirror the actual Qur’ánic sanctions.  This persistence was in fact caused by the mode of transmission and maintenance of the Qur’ánic and the Prophetic traditions associated with it.  I would go further to argue that if the written Qur’án had been actually the source and reference for later generations, it should be possible to find “non-organic” renditions of earlier laws, since later scholars would have been relying on independent reading of the text to come up with diverse and multiple interpretations; just like Powers did when he considered the skeletal Arabic writing of the verses he examined. 

[26] Ascriptive constructionism ought to be understood in the context of arbitrary (less definitive) assigning of meaning. Similarly, the accretive Islamic law that we are proposing is understood in the sense of increase by way of external addition to the original body containing the initial legal proofs.  One may argue that all legal traditions are accretive since they increase every time a precedent is entered into the body of law.  To this I would answer that in modern systems, precedent is adopted as part of the law only after it passes the constitutionality test (jurisdiction of the higher and supreme courts).  In Islamic law, precedent is never checked against the Qur’ánic enunciations, as we will see in the case of <imáriyyah and `awl authored by `Umar and other cases authored by other Caliphs and Companions. 

[27] Paul J. Griffiths, Religious Reading (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[28] Ahmed Souaiaia, The Sociology of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), also see: Arthur Jeffery, Materials for the History of the Text of the Qur’án (Leiden: Brill, 1937), and Kristina Nelson, The Art of Reciting the Qur’án (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985).

[29] Ahmad al-^a<áwí, Shar< Mushkil al-Áthár (Beirút: Mu’assasat al-Risálah, 1994), al-Juwayní, Kitáb al-Talkhí# (Beirút: Dár al-Bashá’ir al-Islámiyyah, 1996), Mohammed Imam, U#úl al-Fiqh al-Islámí (Beirut: al-Mu’assasah al-Jámi`iyyah, 1996), & Mohammed Hisham al-Burhání, Sadd al-Dhará’i` (Beirut: Ma>ba`at al-Ray<ání, 1985).

[30] The recitation rules were included in this reading; see: Sa`íd Mohammed al-La<<ám, Fay_ al-Ra<ím fí Qirá’át al-Qur’án al-Karím (Beirut: Alam al-Kutub, 1995), 77-81.

[31] The symbols shown here may vary from one mu#<af to another as different letters or combination of letters may be used instead of these.

Stop: literally means: blocking and suspending stop: technically means: making a voiceless break at a Qur’ánic word for a brief moment, during which the reader takes a breath with the intention of continuing reading.

The Compulsory Stop: is the stop by which the word and meaning give a complete sense, and this is called complete stop because the utterance is complete and is separated from what follows. It is indicated by (م mím).

The Permissible Stop: is the one at which stopping or continuing is permissible. In this type you can either continue or make a stop. In this case either continuing or making a stop is preferable.

The Sufficient Stop: is the one in which continuing or stopping is permissible; yet making a stop is preferable. It is called sufficient, because it can stand by itself, independently of what follows, because it is not connected with it in words; its symbol is (قلي qalyí)

The Equality Stop: is the one in which continuing and stopping are equally relevant; Its symbol is (ج jím)

The Preferred Stop: is the one in which continuing and stopping is permissible; and yet continuing is desirable.  Its sign is (صلي salyí)

The Prohibited Stop: is the stop made at an incomplete utterance which does not give the required meaning, because it is strongly connected with what follows in terms of words and meaning; This kind of stop is prohibited, Its symbol is ( لاlám-alif)

The Moderate pause: is the breaking of the voice at a Qur’ánic word for a brief moment without taking a breath at two counts [nearly two seconds] Its symbol is (s) ( سsín)

[32] It is also possible to read the verse in a way that allows the parents to compete with the children only in the case where the deceased is survived by just one son and one daughter as that is where the shares of the parents is mentioned.

[33] See Ibn Kathír’s commentary in Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), Appendix B.

[34] Al-^abá>abá’í, al-Mízán fí tafsír al-Qur’án (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-A`lamí li al-Ma>bú`át, 1974), 4:228; where it is mentioned that the verse is a qá`idah.

[35] We have introduced nearly forty cases, in all those cases, Sunni scholars failed to award a share for a female equal to that of a male.  Furthermore, even in the absence of any relative to the deceased besides her, a woman would ultimately compete with the “state” or the “public welfare programs” for the legacy, but never to inherit the entire estate alone.  See Ahmed Souaiaia, The Sociology of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002).

[36] Although exegesis-based is not that certain, Islamic law on shares became so absolute that ignoring an interpretation would amount to ignoring the Qur’án.  There is no consensus on the historical context of the verses of inheritance, yet the meaning had been fixed by way of tafsír.  For more on the peculiarity of  the commentary on the verses of inheritance see: Muhammad al-Balansí, Tafsír Mubhamát al-Qur’án (Beirút: Dár al-Gharb al-Islámí, 1991), 1:320; al-^abarí’s Tafsír, 8:34; and Wá<idí’s Asbáb al-Nuzúl, 138-9.

[37] The materials of tafsír are not necessarily normative collections, rather historical.  The authors of these documents seem to have paid enough care to the recording of the traditions regardless of their implications.  ^abarí’s collection for example, lists a variety of reports most of them are contradictory to each other; hence covering the entire spectrum for possible interpretations.  I think it is because of this seemingly indecisive nature of the documents that some of the authors found it necessary to conclude by determining the authoritative, orthodox, or ijmá`ic view in order to guide the readers.  For more on this point see Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), Appendix B-F in: Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002)

[38] Commentaries as an oral discourse were common even during the time of the Prophet, and even more so after his demise as more Companions served as interpreters of the Qur’án.

[39] Maktúb: may mean a written document

[40] Khalid Abd al-Rahmán `Ak, U#úl al-Tafsír wa Qawá`iduh (Beirut: Dár al-Niffas, 1986), 27.

[41] Mustafa Ibrahim al-Mushina, Madrasat al-Tafsír fí al-Andalus (Beirut: Muassasat al-Risálah, 1986); also see: Abu al-Qásim al-Khú’í, al-Bayán fí Tafsír al-Qur’án (Beirut: Mu`assasat al-A`lamí li al-Manshúrát, 1974), and al-Ishbílí, Qánún al-Ta’wíl (Beirut: Dár al-Gharb al-Islaámí, 1990).

[42] Khalid Abd al-Rahmán `Ak, U#úl al-Tafsír wa Qawá`iduh (Beirut: Dár al-Niffas, 1986), 30.

[43] Al-^abá>abá’í, al-Mízán fí Tafsír al-Qur’án (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-A`lamí li al-Ma>bú`át, 1974), 4:219.

[44] Sunni scholars insist that there is a Qur’ánic basis for `awl, but there has been no attempt to show the organic connection between `wal and the Qur’án.  In many books, it is only stated that `awl is mandated by Qur’ánic proofs, but scholars failed to present any evidence; see: Abd al-Ra<mán al-Sa`dí, Taysír al-Karím al-Ra<mán fí Tafsír Kalám al-Mannán (Beirút: `Alam al-Kutub, 1993), 1:356-7.

[45] Al-^abá>abá’í, al-Mízán fí Tafsír al-Qur’án (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-A`lamí li al-Ma>bú`át, 1974), 4:228.

[46] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: Curzon, 1999), 16.

[47] Of course these were the only credible reports; however, I have looked at a number of other claims about early written documents of <adíth, none of them can be considered a breakthrough.  Nabia Abbott’s discoveries, and most recently, a series of studies undertaken by Muslim scholars aimed at proving that <adíth was recorded during the time of the Prophet are very porous and add more questions than provide answers.  See: Rif`at Abd al-Mu>>alib, @a<ífat Humám Ibn Munabbih (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanjí, 1985).  Even if we were to accept the conclusions drawn by the author of the study, still the “evidence” would only point to the existence of written <adíth only as early as the middle of the second Islamic century, not the time of the Prophet.  Additionally, the manuscripts that were used cannot be dated as a product of the middle of the second Islamic century with absolute certainty, for both documents contain scriptural features that are not characteristic of the Arabic writing of that time period when compared to the more authentic Qur’ánic scripts of the first and second Islamic centuries.  Moreover, any written <adíth collection from this time period is insignificant compared to the massive collections of the 3rd century; Ibn Munabbih’s collection contained only 139 traditions, and only a very small fraction of these traditions were referenced in al-@i<áh al-Sittah.

[48] Later works on the other hand did reference the books of the <adíth instead of relying only on the chain of narrators.  Al-Suyú>í for instance, repeatedly footnoted the works of Bukhárí, Muslim, Málik, and other compilers of <adíth in his book Jámi` al-A<ádíth.  See Suyú>í, Jámi` al-A<ádíth (Syria: Ma>ba`at Muhammad Hashim al-Kutbí, 1979).

[49] Málik was mentioned in the @i<á< as a narrator of some a<ádíth, but the Muwa>>a’ was never referenced as the source of these traditions being recorded.

[50] See table 3.

[51] The fact that the occurrences is <adíth and tafsír being close in number can be explained by the fact that the tafsír works referred to the same <adíth as they were reported in the \adíth.

[52] Málik for instance, always defers to the ancestors and the decisions of the scholars who came before him.  See Muwa>>á’ Málik, Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), Appendix G in: Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002).

[53] Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), Appendix A.

[54] Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002).

[55] See tradition 2018 in Sunan Abí Dáwúd, Appendix G in: Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002).

[56] David Powers, Studies In Qur’án and \adíth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

[57] Yasin Dutton, The Origins Of Islamic Law (Great Britain: CURZON, 1999).

[58] J. Schacht, The Origins Of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

[59] Jamál al-Dín al-Asnawí (d. 772 H.) says on u#úl as a discipline that the first book on u#úl to reach us is Risálat al-Sháfi`í.  It is believed that Sháfi`í is the founder of the science of u#úl based on the information in his books “Jámi` al-`Ilm” and “ ib>ál al-Isti<sán”.  However some have argued that Sháfi`í simply collected and organized the topics covered by this discipline that was in fact started before his time. Abú \anífah and Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybání had written in this subject.  For further discussion see: al-Asnáwí, Jamál al-Dín, al-Kawkab al-Dhurrí, (Jordan, 1985).

[60] Ali Mishkíní, I#tilá<át al-U#úl (Iran: Ma>ba`at al-Hádí, 1413 AH), 62. The author defines u#úl as: “al-`ilm bilqwá`id al-mumahhidah liri`áyat al-a<kám al-shar`iyyah al-far`iyyah ithbátan wa isqá>an.”

[61] Ali Mishkíní, I#tilá<át al-U#úl (Iran: Ma>ba`at al-Hádí, 1413 AH), 62.  Fiqh on the other hand is defined as: “`ilm binafs al-a<kám al-shar`iyyah wa al-wadá’if al-`amaliyyah lá bilqawá`id al-mu`iddah likashf <áliha.”

[62] Abú al-@alá< al-\alabí, al-Káfí fí al-Fiqh (I#fahán: Maktabat al-Imám, 1990).

[63] See Aron Zysow’s unpublished dissertation, The Economy of Certainty, iii.

[64] Abú al-@alá< al-\alabí, al-Káfí fí al-Fiqh (I#fahán: Maktabat al-Imám, 1990).

[65] Sayf al-Dín Abí al-Hasan Ali Ibn Abí Ali Ibn Muhammad Ámidí, al-I<kám fí U#úl al-A<kám, 5.

[66] Sayf al-Dín Abí al-Hasan Ali Ibn Abí Ali Ibn Muhammad Ámidí, al-I<kám fí U#úl al-A<kám, 5.

[67] Al-Baghdádí, U#úl al-Dín, 11-56.

[68] Abú Man#úr `Abd al-Qáhir Ibn ^áhir al-Tamimí al-BaghdádI, U#úl al-Dín (Beirut, 1981), 1-2.

[69] Ismá`íl Ibn Muhammad Ibn al-Fadhl al-I#bahání al-Taymí, al-\ujjah fí bayán al-Ma<ajjah (al-Riyá_: Dár al-Ráyah, 1990), 104-76.

[70] al-Juwayní, al-Shámil fí U#úl al-Dín (Egypt: al-Ma`árif, 1969), 21-79.

[71] Abd al-Rahman Badwi, Madháhib al-Islámiyyín (Egypt: Dár al-`Ilm li al-Maláyín: 1996), 7.

[72] Ali Ibn \azm, al-I<kám fí U#úl al-A<kám (Egypt, 1978), 35-70.

[73] See Shar< al-`Aqá’id by al-Taftázání where he states:  i`lam anna al-a<kám al-shar`iyyah minha má yata`allaqu  bikayfiyyati al-`amali wa tusammá far`iyyah wa `amaliyyah, wa minha má yata`allaqu bi al-i`tiqádi wa tusammá a#liyyah wa i`tiqádiyyah. wa al-`ilmu al-muta`alliqu bi al-úlá yusammá `ilmu al-shará’i`i wa al-a<kámi limá annaha la tustafádu illa min jihati al-shar`i wa yasbiqu al-fahmu `inda itláq al-a<kám illa ilayhá. wa bi al-thániyah: `ilmu al-taw<ídi wa al-#ifát, limá anna thálika ashharu mabá<ithihi wa ashrafu maqásidih. See the same quote cited and commented upon by Abd al-Rahman Badwí, Madháhib al-Islámiyyín (Egypt: Dár al-`Ilm li al-Maláyín: 1996), 28.

[74] Abd al-Rahman Badawí, Madháhib al-Islámiyyín (Egypt: Dár al-`Ilm li al-Maláyín: 1996), 12.

[75] Abd al-Rahman Badawí, Madháhib al-Islámiyyín (Egypt: Dár al-`Ilm li al-Maláyín: 1996), 12.

[76] Abú al-@alá< al-\alabí, al-Káfí fí al-Fiqh (I#fahán: Maktabat al-Imám, 1990).

[77] Abu al-@alá< al-\albí, al-Káfí fí al-Fiqh, 80.

[78] See definition of naskh by al-\alabí in his books al-Káfí fí al-Fiqh, 81.

[79] Proof here refers to the Arabic word dalíl.

[80] The Arabic word used in the definition is sam`an, that is the proof must be heard from the prophet not one reached through reasoning.

[81]Lift” translation to the Arabic ráfi`.

[82] Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Músá \ázimí, Naskh (Cairo: Maktabat `Átif, 1977), 5.

[83] Qur’án, chapter Fussilat, verse 42.

[84] Nadia Sharif al-`Umrí, al-Naskh fí Dirását al-U#úliyyín (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risálah, 1985), 98.

[85] Ahmed Souaiaia, The Sociology of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002).

[86] Recently, more and more scholars are challenging the existing theories that were inherited from the medieval times. See John Burton, The Sources Of Islamic Law (Edinburgh University Press, 1990).

[87] Admittedly, naskh occurrences are historically determined.  They are not supported in the usual sense by the known legal proofs, nor are they verified through the streaming methods and filters of Islamic jurisprudence.  See the conclusion in: Ali Ibn `Abd al-Káfí al-Sabkí, al-Ibháj fí Shar< al-Minháj (Beirut: Dár al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1984), 2:261.

[88] See the definition of naskh by Shi`ite scholars presented above in this chapter

[89] As the practice suggests, every Qur’ánic statement amounts to a direct quote from the deity.  The formula invoked before reading a Qur’ánic statement “qála ta`álá” is indicative of this point of view.

[90] Regarding the exegetical primary sources that we have examined, see Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), Appendix B, C, D, & E.  For <adíth materials, we have combed through thousands of a<ádíth in Muwa>>a’ Málik, Sunan al-Tirmidhí, Sunan Abí Dáwúd, Sunan Ibn Májah, Sunan al-Dáramí, Musnad A<mad, @a<í< al-Bukhárí, @a<í< Muslim, Sunan al-Nasá’í, and al-Káfí.  All the major traditions dealing with inheritance can be found in Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), Appendix G.

[91] The earliest manuscript that we have examined was dated first or second Islamic century.  Those particular manuscripts (see the first seven samples in Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), Appendix F) do not show any diacritics at all let alone an adequate one.

[92] Arthur Jeffery, Materials for the History of the Text of the Qur’án (Leiden: Brill, 1937).

[93] [Q4: V11]

[94] The style of the Qur’ánic discourse for instance is very different from that of the Old Testament and the Bible considering that the Old Testament is more of a narrative than a direct speech.

[95] [Q4: 176]

[96] See Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), Appendix G, section on Muwa>>a’ Málik.

[97] See Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), tradition 2514, Sunan Abí Dáwúd, Appendix G.

[98] See traditions 2026 & 2027 in Sunan al-Tirmidhí; 1533, 1534, & 1535 in Sunan Abí Dáwúd; 2714 & 2716 in Sunan Ibn Májah; 1001, 1002(1), & 1004(1)-(3) in al-Káfí, in Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), Appendix G.

[99] See Ahmed E. Souaiaia, The Sociology Of Inheritance (Seattle: University of Washington Dissertation, 2002), tradition 951 in Muwa>>a’ Málik, Appendix G.

[100] Al-Jawzí, Manáqib al-Imám A<mad Ibn \anbal (Cairo: al-Khánjí Press, 1979), 527.

[101] Ibn \anbal had dreams, and he was the subject of dreams himself: It was reported that he was seen crowned by an angel, he was seen in a dream in which he said that God told him: “O A<mad, this is the crown of waqár, I crowned you with it for saying that the Qur’án was not created.”  For more on this subject see: Al-Jawzí, Manáqib al-Imám A<mad Ibn \anbal (Cairo: al-Khánjí Press, 1979), 530-540.

[102] Al-Jawzí, Manáqib al-Imám A<mad Ibn \anbal (Cairo: al-Khánjí Press, 1979), 543-544.

 
 

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