Books

Page 1

Page 2

Page 3

Page 4

Page 5

Page 6

Page 7

Footnotes

Intervening Kalám: Ascribing Meaning To Dalíl

Muslim as well as critical modern scholarship has come to the conclusion that u#úl materials are the end-result of the process of subjecting tradition to logic.  David S. Powers, for instance, goes as far as building a wall between the so-called Islamic law and Qur’ánic and Prophetic edicts.[56]  Yasin Dutton hints to a transformation in Islamic law when he speaks of post-Sháfi`í Islamic law.[57]   Other scholars went as far as accrediting certain individuals with inventing Islamic legal theory.[58]  I would however, contend that Islamic legal theory did not develop in a vacuum, nor was it shaped exclusively by outside pressures.  Islamic legal theory was a process; a process that was branded by the specifications of Islamic thought and dogma.  In other words, and despite its ostensibly rational and logical reasoning, Islamic legal theory nevertheless relied on orality to remain authoritative.  That branding took place before legal theory differentiated itself from the more inclusive and even more authoritative discipline known as kalám.

Khilafah

Nationalism

Usul

Archives

 In one of the latest definitions provided by a Shí`í traditionalist, u#úl[59] was signified as “the knowledge (`ilm) of rules that permeates the extraction of the secondary legal rulings in a manner of affirmation and refutation.”[60]   This definition obviously does not establish a categorization of u#úl independently; rather, the author maintains the historical connection of u#úl with legal rulings which must be understood as the product of fiqh.  Aware of this delicacy, the author goes on to define fiqh.  Fiqh, he adds, “is the knowledge of the same legal rules and the practical objectives, not the knowledge of the rules that permeates the discovery of itself.”[61]  These definitions are to some extent circular, and are produced with some bias due to sectarian affiliation.[62]  Additionally, an objective reader would recognize the level of uncertainty associated with such a definition. 

That uncertainty could be due to the fact that u#úl and fiqh were originally two branches studied under more inclusive fields, as we will demonstrate in the coming paragraphs.  Subsequently, there was no single fixed definition for each; rather, the two have developed as the disciplines evolved and differentiated.  This process of differentiation affecting Islamic sciences is not peculiar to Islam.  If we consider the Greek civilization, we would observe that sciences then too, developed under the wing of philosophy and only with time did the various disciplines gain independence.  The only difference in this case is that kalám was the mother of all knowledge in the eyes of Muslim scholars,[63] and it was only during the rise of the Abbasid court elitism that Islamic sciences began to form as independent fields of studies.  The construct of u#úl and furú` too went through a process of differentiation as was the case with other Islamic sciences.  Evidence for the fact that u#úl, fiqh, grammar, and even philosophy were inseparable topics growing under the broader discipline of kalám and ethics can be found in the changing definitions adopted by Muslim scholars throughout the Islamic history.[64] 

  For example, during the seventh Islamic century, Ámidí (d. 631 AH) defined u#úl al-fiqh as “the legal proofs, and the manner it induces the legal rulings, and the means by which it is used in general not on the case-by-case basis.  The sources of u#úl is then kalám, Arabic grammar, and legal rules.”[65] Ámidí provides a descriptive rather than a normative definition for u#úl by his use of comparison and determination of the topic of u#úl; a topic that is clearly more inclusive than that limited by modern scholarship.  Ámidí was not the only scholar to link u#úl to another discipline and to make it merely a branch of a broader one.[66]  I would argue that the further we go back in time, the less independent u#úl becomes as a field of studies.  For instance, Baghdádí (d. 429 AH)—who wrote on the subject nearly two centuries before Ámidí—addressing the u#úl issues in a broader field namely, u#úl al-dín,[67] in which he discussed both theological and ethical issues as well as legal theory questions[68] including the question of imámah.[69]  Similarly, Imám al-\aramayn al-Juwayní (d. 478 AH) wrote about u#úl al-a<kám in a more inclusive work where he sub-divided his book into two major chapters: one dubbed Kitáb al-Taw<íd which dealt with theological matters, and the other named Kitáb al-`Ilal and dealt with legal issues.[70]

     What makes this subordination of u#úl al-fiqh to other disciplines more evident is the explicit relationship between these various fields as expressed in the writings of Muslim scholarship even in modern times.  A classic example is this attempt by Badawí to define kalám where he argued that “`ilm al-kalám, also known as u#úl al-dín, was first named al-fiqh al-akbar by Imam Abú \anífah.  It was also known as `ilm al-na~ar wa al-istidlál and `ilm al-taw<íd wa al-#ifát.[71]  Clearly, for Badawí, and many other Muslim scholars, kalám, u#úl, fiqh, ethics, and theology were all topics of the same discipline.  Modern Muslim scholars tend to adopt classical views even if they are conflicting as they hardly criticize the findings of the salaf,[72] and because they generally rely on materials from their own school of thought without any critical appraisal of these definitions.  That also could be a major reason for the existence of conflicting definitions.  With that said, it is also possible to attribute the changing definitions to the evolutionary path that established precedence and content of fields that were, in one way or another, related to u#úl al-fiqh.  For instance, Taftázání, who is known for his work on u#úl al-fiqh, did not see it as an independent discipline that was separate from the broader field of u#úl al-dín:

The branch dealing with secondary rules—that is the practical ones—are known as `ilm al-shará’i` wa al-a<kám.  As for the primary rules—that is, matters of creed, they are known as `ilm al-taw<íd wa al-#ifát.[73]

U#úl al-dín on the other hand had been—and still is (according to some)—perceived as a synonym to kalám.  In fact, there is the argument that the various connotations are simply descriptive and do not reflect a fundamental difference in substance and method.  In that regard, Badawí argues that the reason u#úl al-dín was called kalám, is the fact that its practitioners generally inherited a great ability to talk on matters of law, or because the chapters of books in this field started with the common header “al-kalám fí”.[74]  As for the reason it was dubbed u#úl al-dín, he elucidated that “this discipline—meaning u#úl al-dín—is the foundation of all legal studies.”[75]

From the above citations, there remains no doubt that a great number of Muslim scholars understood u#úl al-fiqh to be a branch of—if not the same as—u#úl al-dín, and that u#úl al-dín was nothing other than the broader and older discipline known as kalám.[76]  If one were to compare the Greek renaissance era to the intellectual growth in the Islamic civilization, he would easily see that kalám was to early Muslim scholars, what philosophy was to early Greek thinkers and scientists. 

Establishing the link between the various disciplines of law and ethics on one hand, and kalám on the other allow us to conclude that the earliest enunciations of juridical principles themselves were expressed in an oral discourse.  For more than two centuries, kalám was the dominant—if not the only— scheme of deriving, preserving and transmitting legal and juridical rulings.

Copyright ©  SOUAIAIA. All rights reserved.